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Abstract 
The principal aim of this dissertation is to examine the influence of board of directors’ 
diversity on corporate tax aggressiveness. I thorough investigation was made on the 
influence of board diversity on tax aggressiveness and also, on tax aggressive measures in 
recent prior literature. Based on a sample of 112 Greek companies covering the 2014-2018 
period (560 firm year observation). My Ordinary Least Square results represented a 
significant and negative association between the proportion of women that served in the 
firm’s board each year and the tax aggressive measures. This result was consistent with both 
measure of tax aggressiveness which were included in the models.  
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1. Introduction  
 
An increasing divergence has been developed between the tax rules and the accounting 
rules, which companies adopt in order to conduct their financial statements. Tax 
aggressiveness has become of increasing concern to the Greek tax authorities the past years 
as tax collection is the main source of revenue of the Greek State. According to the 
respective Annual Reports of Bank of Greece, the tax revenue from legal entities had many 
fluctuations the past years. As can be seen from the graph, tax revenue started to increase 
steadily between 2013 and 2017, from about 1681 million euros to 3969 million euros (see 
Appendix 3 Graph 1). After that, tax revenue fell to 3471 million euros, which was a small 
decrease compare to the previous years and then, rose to 3680 million in 2018. Considering 
the fact that the corporate tax rate of the legal entities that keep a double entry accounting 
system was increased to 29% (4334/2015 law) in 2015 for three consecutive years, and then, 
it was decreased to 28%, in 2018 (see Appendix 3 Graph 2), probably indicates the beginning 
of a more balanced relationship between the Greek government and the Greek firms.  
Governments, though impact board of directors’ decision through tax enforcement (Desai, 
Dyck, & Zingales, 2007). To increase the revenue from tax payments, Government might 
impose laws that increase corporate tax rates and withholding tax rates or alter tax return 
policies, deductibility and exempt income criteria. The Board of Directors usually contradicts 
to these policies through the engagement in aggressive tax planning strategies in order to 
avoid paying taxes. There are strong evidence which prove that tax aggressiveness and tax 
avoidance are significantly related to corporate governance(Armstrong, Blouin, Jagolinzer, & 
Larcker, 2015; Lanis & Richardson, 2011). This motivated me to search about the specific 
characteristics of corporate governance that might influence corporate policies and 
especially, corporate tax policies. Boardroom diversity has a broad definition of possible 
determinants, e.g. gender diversity, independence, nationality, age and education. Following 
prior literature, there is evidence that the personal traits of women who serve on the board 
of directors influence corporate tax policies(Lanis, Richardson, & Taylor, 2017a). Women are 
by nature more risk averse than men when facing a risky situation(Adams & Ferreira, 2009a) 
such as the adoption of an aggressive corporate tax policy (Gupta, Mortal, Chakrabarty, Guo, 
& Turban, 2019). 
The increasing presence of women in upper positions of the corporations (Gupta et al., 
2019), motivated me to investigate the influence of women on tax aggressiveness when they 
serve on the board of directors. I made a small investigation on the female directors who 
served on the board in 2018 in Greek companies. I concentrated on companies which have 
their headquarters in Greece and they traded in the securities market in the Athens Stock 
Exchange (ASE). According to the annual reports of 151 Greek companies listed in ASE in 
2018, 57,62% of the companies include at least one women on the company’s board of 
directors. At first glance, this is a sign of tokenism, which means that women stand in the 
board of directors as symbols(tokens). In 2014, 62% of Europe companies had at least one 
woman in the Board of Directors, while in a research that was made in US the percentage 
reached up to 65%(Adams & Ferreira, 2009a). Then, I broaden my research from 2014 to 
2018 and I extracted information from 112 Greek companies in ASE (see Data Sample), the 
percentage of women serving on the board rose from 53,57% to 58,93%.  
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I hypothesized in this dissertation that female directors should be less risk averse than male 
directors in order to adopt less aggressive corporate tax policies. Based on sample of 112 
Greek companies listed in the Athens Stock Exchange, my ordinary least square regression 
indicates that there is a negative and statistical significant relation between women’s 
presence on board and tax aggressiveness. This results are consistent across two of the most 
popular measure that were used in high rated journals in the last five years.   
This dissertation contributes to literature in several ways. First, there are few studies that 
investigate the effect of gender diversity on tax aggressiveness. My results contribute to an 
understanding of the determinants of the directors’ behavior on tax aggressive issues and 
mostly, on the risk preferences between men and women. Second, the topic is concurrent, 
because I investigate the boardroom gender diversity effect on tax aggressiveness. Third, I 
use a sample of Greek companies contributing to a better understanding of gender diversity 
in Greece. Gender issue has been of increasing concern across Europe and US the last few 
years, and there were countries such as Norway, who have gender quotas on board of 
directors. In Greece this issue is not further developed and this dissertation contributes to 
the solving of potential future questions and misunderstandings on boardroom diversity and 
tax aggressive issues. Fourth, a wide range of control variables is used in order to better 
analyze the determinants of boardroom diversity.  
The remainder of this dissertation is organized as follows. First, it is the section of Theory & 
Empirical Studies, which has four subsections. The first subsections are the “the effects’ of 
directors’ attributes on the adoption of corporate tax policies” where I represent the 
respective theories and other articles that empirically proved those theories generally and 
then I specify my theories on the second subsection which is “The role of gender diversity in 
the directors’ attributes that affect corporate tax policies”. The third subsection is the 
“Factors that diminish the power of directors and affect the corporate tax policies”. The 
fourth subsection is the “Institutional framework: Greece”, where I represent the 
institutions that exist in the Greek market. Second, it is the section of “Empirical research on 
tax aggressiveness/avoidance”, where I made a small research in recent articles published in 
high rated journals and I represents the advantages and the disadvantages of the most 
popular tax aggressive/avoidance measures. Third, it is the section of “Gender differences in 
Tax aggressiveness: Hypothesis development” where I represent what other studies 
empirically proved for this issue in specific and I am making my hypothesis. Fourth, it is the 
research design which is separated into four subsections. The first subsection is the “data 
and Hand-collection”, in which a describe the extraction of the data procedure. The second 
subsection is the “Dependent variable”. The third subsection is the “Independent variable”. 
The Fourth subsection is the “Control Variables” and the fifth subsection is the Regression 
Model, in which I analyze the regression methods. Then, it is the “Empirical results and 
Analysis” which is separated into “Descriptive Statistics”, “Correlation Matrix” and “Results”. 
Finally, there the “Conclutions”, “references” and “Appendices”.  
 
2. Theory & Empirical Studies 
2.1 The effect of directors’ attributes on the adoption of corporate tax policies 
Management and control is separated in almost all multinational and listed companies. This 
phenomenon created a conflict of interest between the top executives and the shareholders 
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(agency problem). Instead of the agency theory which explicitly refers to the management 
act as principal (Kovermann & Velte, 2019), stakeholder theory includes all the stakeholder 
of the firm, in order to interpret the adopted corporate policies. Local community is a 
stakeholder which gives some privileges to the corporate and expect, in exchange, qualifying 
leads for community’s life quality (Hill & Jones, 1992). A way of supporting governments to 
improve social welfare is the payment of corporate taxes, in which outside directors are 
more interested in (Lanis & Richardson, 2018).  
IRC has defined the board of directors as a significant determinant of corporate tax policy 
(Lanis & Richardson, 2018). Upper Echelon theory aligns with statement supporting the 
argument that top executives due to their position in the firm are enabled to determine the 
corporate strategic formation and enactment (Gupta et al., 2019). Giving a clearer view on 
this association, according to the “tone at the top” theory, top executives affect the 
corporate tax policies through the provision of incentives to tax directors and affecting the 
resources allocation as far as the advisors’ recruitment in different departments is 
concerned (Dyreng, Hanlon, & Maydew, 2010). The objectives that motivate the directors to 
be aggressive are the managerial opportunism and self-serving objectives(Chung, Goh, Lee, 
& Shevlin, 2019).  
As it comes to the empirical studies concerning the existence of relation between the board 
of directors and the corporate tax policies, corporate governance is sensitive to the 
fluctuation of tax rates, where the corporate governance ‘quality’ is the determinant of the 
type of corporate response to these fluctuations (Desai et al., 2007). The quality of 
governance determines the level which executive exploit the corporates’ opacity deriving 
from tax aggressiveness in order to profit from inside trading (Chung et al., 2019). The type 
of management is separated into Defenders, Prospectors and Analyzers. Prospectors who 
embrace uncertainty and innovation (more R&D expenditures), are more tax aggressive than 
Defenders and Analyzers(Higgins, Omer, & Phillips, 2015). Aligning with these outcomes, the 
companies with higher R&D expense have lowest potential to pay taxes (Guenther, Wilson, 
& Wu, 2018).  
2.2 The role of gender diversity in the directors’ attributes that affect corporate 
tax policies.  
Under the managerial discretion theory, when the board of directors is challenged by low 
analyst coverage quality and low levels of institutional ownership, adopts more aggressive 
corporate tax policies(Gupta et al., 2019). Thereafter, the type of management’s strategy 
determines their behavior. Directors who avoid innovative strategies, Defenders, tend to 
engage in less risky policies (Higgins et al., 2015). The risk preference is a main determinant 
of the policy enactment and it is innately determined by gender (Adhikari, Agrawal, & Malm, 
2019). A problem that female directors face these days is the sign of tokenism, their 
symbolic position in the corporation. In order to make a theoretical review more 
approachable to gender appeal in the boardroom, critical mass theory infers to a critical 
threshold which represents the number of women needed so as to be heard on the 
boardroom minutes (Torchia, Calabrò, & Huse, 2011). Moreover, education, experience and 
skills are concerned as human capital of directors which, under the Human Capital theory, 
may contribute to the corporation (Carter, D'Souza, Simkins, & Simpson, 2010).  
The risk preference is a key determinant of the corporate policies. Several studies empirically 
proved that woman are more risk averse than men. The gender difference is considered as a 
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trait, a particular type of behavior which is persistent across time and situations (Powell & 
Ansic, 1997). In more recent literature, it is supported that men and women differ in some 
psycho-social characteristics such as ethical and risk taking which may affect their decision 
when they take top-executives’ positions (Gupta et al., 2019). Moreover, there is also the 
rationale that women tend to be more risk averse and conservative to their decision making 
(Adhikari et al., 2019; Lanis et al., 2017a). These attributes are extended, women are 
characterized as less overconfident and hubris as far as their abilities are concerned 
(Adhikari et al., 2019; Kovermann & Velte, 2019). Despite these, women are also considered 
trustworthy and more compliant with rules and regulations contributing to the empirical 
result that woman are less tax aggressive than men (Lanis et al., 2017a). While, men tend to 
adopt riskier policies and engage in more unethical strategies, women when are in top 
management positions, are associated with lower operating lawsuits and thus, engage in 
safer corporate policies (Adhikari et al., 2019; Gupta et al., 2019). Finally, men are 30% more 
likely to have attendance problems than women (Adams & Ferreira, 2009a).  The point at 
issue though, it is what is best for the shareholders’ value and the corporate financial 
performance and thus, it is mandatory to mention some inconsistencies in the empirical 
research about gender differences. Women are considered to be tougher monitors and 
engage in less aggressive tax policies (Adams & Ferreira, 2009a; Lanis et al., 2017a). 
However, excessive monitoring may be counterproductive and thus, affect negatively 
shareholders’ value (Adams & Ferreira, 2009a). Contributing to this phenomenon, the 
avoidance of aggressive R&D policies, when women are in top management positions, is 
translated to lower operating lawsuits and subsequently to a loss of 7% of firm valuation 
(Adhikari et al., 2019). At this point, it must be mentioned that the effect of women on 
financial performance is not clearly identified, since studies provide no assurance whether 
women are associated with higher financial indicators or the fact that most profitable firms 
are eligible to recruit more women in their board of directors (Brieger, Francoeur, Welzel, & 
Ben-Amar, 2019) . On the contrary, there empirical evidence that, a positive relation exists 
between the number of woman and ethnic minorities (sub-sample of the gender sample) in 
the board with ROA (Carter et al., 2010). 
Women though have to confront with tokenism. The reason why women might be 
counterproductive derives from the pressure they confront with their distinction as tokens 
(Adams & Ferreira, 2009a). According to the aforementioned study, 62% of Europe 
companies had at least one woman in the Board (in 2014), while in their US data sample the 
percentage reached up to 65%. The sign of tokens is an old issue, where women hold 
significant position in the Board of Directors of large companies and though, are chosen to 
be members of board for the sake of image (Kesner, 1988). A possible explanation is met in 
most recent literature, it is proved that the board of directors need ‘at least three women’ in 
order for their decisions to distinguish and make an influence on the boardrooms’ meetings 
(Torchia et al., 2011).  
According to the empirical results in literature, gender and independence diversity may 
affect the corporate tax policy. Gender may affect the human capital of corporation and 
thus, minority in the board have distinguished characteristic as far as the education, 
experience and skills are concerned (Carter et al., 2010). The educational background 
though, do not explain the tax aggressiveness’ variations. If the financial knowledge of the 
boardroom is low, the corporate tax policy may be aggressive because of the “tone at the 
top” effect (Dyreng et al., 2010). As far as the percentage of executives is concerned, outside 
directors are less tax aggressive due to their interest in social welfare (Lanis & Richardson, 
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2018). However, individual executives differ in propensity toward tax avoidance policies 
(Dyreng et al., 2010).  
2.3 Factors that diminish the power of directors and affect the corporate tax 
policies 
Under some circumstances the objectives of tax aggressiveness are diminished by strong 
analyst coverage, institutional ownership and governments’ instruments. As inferred to the 
agency theory, the management acts as an agent of the shareholders which means that they 
are accountable for their actions to their shareholders in the fear of losing their job 
(Kovermann & Velte, 2019). According to the managerial discretion theory, the power of 
Directors (Upper Echelon) is diminished when analyst coverage and institutional ownership 
is in in a high level  (Gupta et al., 2019). Analyst coverage enhances corporate transparency, 
while the existence of blockholders strengthens the position of shareholders (Shleifer & 
Vishny, 1986). Therefore, according to theory, there are some governance mechanism which 
may reverse the impact of Board of Directors’ characteristics on the decision-making. 
Despite of these two governance mechanisms, at the stakeholder level, the local 
governments may affect the corporate tax policy through the fluctuations of the tax rates, 
the relation between insiders and outsiders (corporate governance) and therefore, the 
corporate tax policies (Desai et al., 2007).  
Empirical studies have proved that the impact of Board of Directors’ characteristics on their 
decision is not always dominant, under some circumstances directors are confront with 
external pressure. The power of Directors (Upper Echelon) is dominant when analyst 
coverage and institutional ownership is in a low level  (Gupta et al., 2019). Directors are less 
aggressive, especially when top executives are subjected to scrutiny by analyst coverage  
(Balakrishnan, Blouin, & Guay, 2018; Gupta et al., 2019). Moreover, empirical studies 
emphasizing on the magnitude of analyst coverage prove that information asymmetry and 
corporate transparency is negatively related to tax aggressiveness  (Balakrishnan et al., 2018; 
Chen & Lin, 2017). In response of the aforementioned theory about the effect of the 
governments’ influence, empirical studies have reached to the conclusion that firms which 
experience some pressure on their transparency, moderate the adoption of tax aggressive 
policies which occurred with the introduction of FIN 48 (Chung et al., 2019) or the delivery of 
the SEC  (Kubick, Lynch, Mayberry, & Omer, 2016).  
2.4 Institutional framework (Greece) 
 
According to the annual report of Bank of Greece, the corporate income tax has been 
increased since 2017 due to businesses’ profitability increase. Despite the economy 
improvement, there is a significant reduction to the public investments which is not followed 
by a respective increase in the private sectors’ investment. This fact raises some uncertainty 
about the prospect of business development and therefore, the increase of income from 
corporate taxes.  As far as the tax controls are concerned, the companies are obliged to two 
types of tax control. First, there are subjected to tax compliance audit by a statutory auditor 
who optionally, issues the relevant Tax Compliance Certificate (article 82 of the Law 
2238/1994; article 65A of the Law 4174/13). Second, the companies are subject to tax audit 
by the respective tax authorities regardless of the Tax Compliance Certificate issuance 
(Circular 1006/05.01.2016) indicating the magnitude of tax authorities’ involvement in the 
final determination act. Moreover, under the Gas Law (4308/2014), public interest 
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companies and financial institutions, which are the most companies in the sample under 
scrutiny, are subjected to IFRS.  
The Athens Stock Exchange (ASE) includes 190 Greek Companies which contribute to the 
revenues of the Government through the payment of the corporate income tax. The Greek 
financial system is “relation-based’ or insider system which has as a consequence the impact 
of insiders and their families on the corporate governance  (Sikalidis & Leventis, 2017). The 
managerial opportunism and self-serving objectives that insiders may possess might lead to 
the adoption of an aggressive tax corporate policy  (Chung et al., 2019). Under this point of 
view, insiders are better informed than the other stakeholders and they might profiteer 
from the information asymmetry.  
The Greek government has taken into consideration the large magnitude of the executives 
on society’s issues, and subsequently, on tax avoidance  (Dyreng et al., 2010). In order to 
minimize the effect of executive and insiders, Greek Government imposed laws that 
determine the number of non –executive and independent non-executive directors in order 
to protect the shareholders’ rights, especially the minorities of them.  According to the 
Greek law, the number of non-executive members has not to be less than the one third (1/3) 
of the total number of the boardroom members. Had the boardroom have representatives 
of the shareholders’ minorities, the entity is not obliged to have two (2) independent non-
executive members between the non-executive members (art. 3 par.1 of L. 3016/2002). 
Moreover, in order to encourage the stability of the Greek banking system, the Hellenic 
Financial Stability Fund has a representative in Banks’ boardroom (Art 10 par 2 of l. 
3864/2010), which is irrelevant with the representative of the Greek Government of L. 
3723/2008 (Art 10 par 2 of l. 3864/2010). In less words, there are two types of 
representatives in the banks. This is an issue that has already triggered the attention of 
other investigators and authors who proved that the existence of representatives in the 
banks’ boardroom reduces the corporate tax aggressiveness.  
3. Empirical research on tax aggressiveness/avoidance 
 
Tax avoidance and tax aggressiveness are two terms that captured the attention of many 
authors who have strived to appropriately delineate their definitions let alone find measures 
without any restrictions. Not least among the difficulties in calculating a tax aggressive 
measure is the fact that an activity is recognized as illegal or legal after the tax control from 
the local tax authorities (Balakrishnan et al., 2018; Hanlon & Heitzman, 2010). Despite these 
limitations, a small research of mine on tax aggressiveness and tax avoidance measures 
resulted in some basic residuals and ratios that were identically used or processed further in 
order to identify and address the weaknesses of the measures. The sample was based on 
thirty-seven (37) articles (see Appendix 3 Chart 1) which included in their title the keyword 
of “tax avoidance” or “tax planning” or “tax aggressiveness” in the past five years (from 2014 
till the August of 2019). The articles were retained from seven (7) four-star and three-star 
journals listed in “Accounting” subsection of the Academic Journal Guide published by the 
Chartered Association of Business Schools (“ABS Guide”). 
The measures that were mostly used during this period in the journals under 
scrutiny are the GAAP ETR and the Cash ETR. The ETR is the total tax expense scaled by pre-
tax book income, commonly named in the literature as GAAP ETR, which companies are 
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obliged to disclose in the financial statements. The annual calculation of this ratio is the 
main disadvantage because it excludes the year-to-year variation (Balakrishnan et al., 2018; 
Dyreng, Hanlon, & Maydew, 2008). This obstacle is overwhelmed by using as a nominator 
the sum of total tax expense the past three years and also, the sum of pre-tax book income 
the past three years. Despite the year-to-year variation, the nominator (total tax expense) is 
the sum of current and deferral tax. A possible reduction of the current tax may lead to the 
increase of deferral tax. The inverse relation of the nominators’ components may lead to the 
same rates of total tax expenses even though the companies adopt different tax planning 
strategies (Dyreng et al., 2008). Another weakness of this ratio which is similar to the Cash 
ETR is that it does not take into consideration the tax credits. For example, companies that 
have higher R&D expenses have more tax credits and thus, possess lower ETR rates than 
those that belong to other sectors (Balakrishnan et al., 2018). In order to eliminate those 
weakness, current ETR was introduced which is the current tax expense scaled by pre-tax 
book income. The ratio though, led to spurious results due to the use of accrual based 
accounts (Dyreng et al., 2008; Hanlon & Heitzman, 2010). The accounts which are used in 
the calculation of GAAP ETR and current ETR derive from Income Statement which is accrual 
based (current tax is derived from the notes) creating a confusion over the real period that 
tax is avoided. To eliminate the accrual based accounts, the ETR ratio was evolved into Cash 
ETR (Dyreng et al., 2008), which is the most used ratio in this sample of thirty-seven (37) 
articles.  
Cash ETR has a significant advantage over the GAAP ETR ratio which is its nominator. 
The nominator is the cash tax paid which is extracted from the information in the Cash Flow 
Statement so as not to be accrual based and capture the real time effect of tax avoidance or 
aggressiveness (Dyreng et al., 2008). Although this attribute is the main reason that is mostly 
used, there are some inconsistencies that existed and motivated the evolvement of the ratio 
especially as far as the denominator is concerned. First, book pre-tax income which is 
derived from the income statement and is used as denominator is accrual based creating 
inconsistences. Second, book pre-tax income is an account which can be affected by 
earnings management policies and not inclusively from tax planning purposes. The cash 
flows from operations used as a denominator is a more representative account than pre-tax 
book income in order to capture both conforming and non-conforming tax planning 
strategies and also, the economic activity (Hoopes, Mescall, & Pittman, 2012; McGuire, 
Wang, & Wilson, 2014). Finally, some studies support that the ratio should include some 
industry-matched attributes such as the deviation of GAAP ETR ratio from the firm’s mean 
industry size GAAP ETR (Balakrishnan et al., 2018) and the replacement of total pre-tax book 
income with the lagged total assets variable in the assumption that similar sized  firms adopt 
the same tax policies (Badertscher, Katz, Rego, & Wilson, 2019).  
The second category of measures that is mostly used to capture tax aggressiveness 
and tax avoidance is the Book-Tax Difference (Hanlon & Heitzman, 2010). Book-tax 
difference derives from the difference between the firm’s book income and the firm’s 
taxable income (Desai & Dharmapala, 2006; Frank, Lynch, & Rego, 2009; Khan, Srinivasan, & 
Tan, 2016). The main weakness of this ratio is that the taxable income is not publicly 
available and thus, researchers derive information from financial statements so as to 
estimate taxable income. Book-tax difference can be distinguished into permanent book-tax 
differences, which is the sum of federal tax expense and foreign tax expense scaled by the 
statutory tax rate and the temporary book-tax differences, which are computed by the 
deferred tax expense scaled by statutory rate(Higgins et al., 2015; Hsu, Moore, & Neubaum, 
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2018). The repatriation of foreign income in multinational companies though, is an aspect of 
this measure that should carefully be taken into consideration in order to avoid any 
miscalculation due to tax returns  (Brieger et al., 2019; Desai & Dharmapala, 2006). Due to 
some inconsistencies some authors regressed those ratios on items (such as 
nondiscretionary items) so as to exclude them from the dependent variables and used the 
residuals as the main tax aggressiveness or tax avoidance variable. The most popular 
measure is the discretionary permanent differences which is based on permanent 
differences (Frank et al., 2009). The main advantage of this model is that it excludes the non-
discretionary items by regressing total permanent differences on nondiscretionary items 
(intangible assets, state taxes) which are not associated with aggressive tax planning.  The 
exclusion of nondiscretionary items is more important than the exclusion of temporary 
differences which in accordance with pre-tax earnings create spurious results, because pre-
tax income is also a measure of earnings management. Earnings management is an issue 
that, in prior literature, investigators made an effort to exclude from book-tax 
differences(Desai & Dharmapala, 2006). They actually regressed book-tax gap on total tax 
accruals in order to exclude earnings management’s effect. The exclusion of non-
discretionary items of model (Frank et al., 2009) was more used than the model in which 
earnings management is excluded (Desai & Dharmapala, 2006)and thus, I separated from 
book-tax difference column (see Appendix 3 Chart 1).  The section of book-tax difference 
includes models such as the two aforementioned models about discretionary items and 
earnings management exclusion.   In comparison with ETR variables, permanent book-tax 
difference capture not only actual permanent book-tax difference but also the effect of all 
ETR reconciliation items (Higgins et al., 2015).  
The other two categories are the Unrecognized Tax Benefits and the tax shelter 
measures. UTB that are applicable with the introduction of FIN 48 are for a limited number 
of years and also, it is hard to apply in Greek industry since the companies are in accordance 
with IFRS and GAAS. The Greek market is small, which make it reasonable for big listed-firms 
(see Data & Hand collection) to have at least one subsidiary in a foreign country in order to 
expand its business activities. Tax shelter measures require multinational firms (Balakrishnan 
et al., 2018) in a broader definition (in the US market) making it difficult to apply this 
measure in the Greek firms and any further investigation is beyond of this dissertation’s 
scope. Moreover, I will also represent an interesting ratio (LEE, LIM, Kanagaretnam, & Lobo, 
2014) which is based on the difference between the taxes that the companies paid and the 
taxes that the companies should have paid. They multiplied the firm’s pre-tax income with 
the base country statutory tax rate and they subtracted the firm’s actual tax expense, scaled 
by total assets. The aforementioned studies present as the basic disadvantage of Effective 
Tax Rates (ETR) the inclusion of earnings before tax or book income. This measure calculates 
the tax had the book income equals tax income and subtracts the cash tax expense in order 
to take into consideration the missing revenue due to tax avoidance. This has as a result the 
reduction of the firm’s income taxes from the amount that would have been charged at the 
base country’s statutory tax rate. In case the ratio is negative, it could be considered as an 
earnings management ratio that is why it needs a careful sample collection excluding the 
firms’ with negative earnings before income tax expenses. This measure is not suitable in the 
Greek industries’ data because there are many companies with net loss and this might 
create confusion on the final results  
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4. Gender differences in Tax aggressiveness: Hypothesis 
development 
The boardroom characteristics that interfere in the corporate governance are 
further investigated by many authors who delineated the possible adopted corporate 
policies under specific personal traits of directors in the boardroom. Independence, diligence 
and expertise are three factors that positively affect the decision of the board of directors as 
far as the decision about the audit fees is concerned. These characteristics enhance the 
board of directors’ concern about reputation capital, legal liability and shareholder interest 
to an extent that influences the corporate policies they must adopt (Carcello, Hermanson, 
Neal, & Riley Jr, 2002). Moreover, the size of board of directors and audit committees 
constitutes a crucial factor in monitoring financial process (Anderson, Mansi, & Reeb, 2004). 
The issue in this dissertation is whether gender is more important than the other personal 
traits so as to constitute a major factor in the adoption of tax aggressive corporate policies. 
Most studies support that women are more risk averse than men (Adams & Ferreira, 
2009a; Adhikari et al., 2019) and thus, adopt less aggressive corporate policies(Francis, 
Hasan, Wu, & Yan, 2014; Lanis et al., 2017a). In prior research, this phenomenon has been 
interpreted by three possible explanations according to female personal traits following 
Francis et al. (2014). First, under uncertain circumstances, women are likely to be more 
nervous and fearful than men (Francis et al., 2014).  Tax uncertainty and tax avoidance have 
been further investigated in previous studies, which rationalized the volume of aggressive 
policies by putting an emphasis on the stakeholder pressure to minimize tax avoidance in 
order to avoid reputational loss  (Guenther et al., 2018). This empirical result in combination 
with the women’s intense behavior facing an uncertain condition could be reasonably 
explain the adoption of prudent policies by women rather than men in order to avoid future 
lawsuits (Adhikari et al., 2019). Second, women lack confidence  (Adams & Ferreira, 2009a; 
Lanis et al., 2017a) and thus, they are more conservative to riskier situations. Finally, men 
tend to interpret riskier situation as challenges rather than a potential threat to the firm’s 
reputation or performance (Francis et al., 2014), which is reasonably connected with the 
empirical results that women who possess powerful position on a firm adopt policies that 
minimize litigation risk  (Adhikari et al., 2019).  
Riskiness is an attribute that most authors used to interpret female directors’ 
behavior on boardroom meetings and it is widely mentioned in prior research  (Francis et al., 
2014; Gupta et al., 2019) and their appearance on boards sensitizes to sustainability issues 
(Adams & Ferreira, 2009a). Women’s position to respective matters has proved on empirical 
research that gender diversity in the board of directors is positively related to the quality of 
CSR disclosure (Katmon, Mohamad, Norwani, & Al Farooque, 2019; Lanis & Richardson, 
2018). All these factors have been enhancing the concerns about the board of directors’ 
quality in prior years  (Carcello et al., 2002). The quality issue though, has been developed in 
recent research studies, since managerial extraction plays a key role in the adoption of 
corporate tax policies (Chung et al., 2019).  Moreover, female directors are tougher monitors 
and women are less likely to face attendance problems than men who serve on the board of 
directors. Attendance behavior is of major importance due to the fact that board meetings 
are the main avenue which directors extract the appropriate information in order to carry 
out their duties (Adams & Ferreira, 2009a).  
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Specifically, women are less aggressive as it comes to R&D or marketing policies  (Adhikari et 
al., 2019), which is a characteristic of directors, who tend to follow more conservative 
polices (called Defenders) and thus, they prefer to adopt less tax aggressive policies (Higgins 
et al., 2015). Moreover, empirical results have showed that the presence of women in the 
board of directors is negatively associated with tax aggressiveness   (Lanis et al., 2017a). 
Contributing to this notion, women in CFO position have less possibilities to adopt tax 
aggressive policies than men, while female CFOs are less likely to adopt different preference 
in the volume of tax aggressiveness, under less risky circumstances. Taking into 
consideration the aforementioned prior literature, I use the following hypothesis: 
Hypothesis 1: All else being equal, female directors are less likely to adopt tax aggressive 
policies than male directors.  
 
 
5. Research design 
5.1 Sample & Hand collection  
The data sample is consisted of companies which their headquarters are located in Greece 
and they are trading in the securities market in the Athens Stock Exchange from 2014 to 
2018. However, there were enough difficulties in the collection of the data, since there is a 
lack in the variables of the directors’ personal characteristics. Some personal characteristics, 
which are the average annual age of directors, the directors’ nationality, their finance or tax 
expertise and the years that the director has served in the CEO position, are hard to find in 
the databases. Moreover, the sample consists of panel data, which requires the time 
variation of the variables included in the model. Since databases did not include the yearly 
variation of membership of the directors in the boardroom, the data were primarily 
constructed from the annual financial statement. I downloaded the annual reports of the 
companies from the respective intersection of the website of the Athens Stock Exchange and 
I recorded the board of directors’ names from 2014 to 2018 for each company. Under this 
structure, I searched in the financial statements the directors’ personal characteristics, in 
order to capture the yearly variation of the variables since the synthesis of the board of 
directors had change the period under scrutiny. Most of the firms’ financial statements 
though, did not include some personal characteristics of the directors such as age, education 
and nationality. In order to fill in the gaps, I used Amadeus and Thompson databases or their 
linkedin profile so as to extract the relevant information with the aforementioned personal 
characteristics of the directors. Exhausting every option as it comes to the extraction of 
directors’ personal data, my dataset consists of 112 Greek companies which have been 
member in the Athens Stock Exchange from 2014 to 2018. 
Overall, the final data sample is consisted of 112 Greek Companies that were listed in the 
ASE from 2014 to 2018 which means that the data is panel. Moreover, I chose to use data 
from years 2014 to 2018 because this period appeared more stable to me. There are not 
wide income tax rates fluctuations compared to previous years and there was an upward in 
the tax revenues due to the increase of Greek firms’ profitability (see Appendix 1).  
5.2 Dependent variable: The measures of tax aggressiveness  
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The significant absence of some personal information about the members of board of 
directors in the both databases led to the exclusion of a great portion of the firms included 
in the sample. Consistent with prior researches(Higgins et al., 2015), I could remove the 
Greek Companies that had negative earnings before income taxes (EBIT) or missing cash 
taxes paid but I tried to find a more approachable tax aggressive measures in order not to 
exclude other companies from my sample. This is the reason why I selected a measure which 
concentrates on book-tax differences. This measure enables me to include companies with 
negative earnings before income taxes, because it is affected by the difference between 
earnings before income taxes and taxable income rather than the negative sign of P/L before 
taxes. After including a dependent variable without minimizing further my dataset, I selected 
GAAP ETR as the second measure and I excluded the values with negative book pre-tax 
income (see Appendix 1).   
The first measure is an adjusted permanent book-tax difference ratio to the Greek legislation 
(PERMBTD), and thus, it is more suitable for the respective sample of the Greek companies. 
The concertation on the difference between book income and tax income gives the privilege 
to include companies with negative values because it is based on the difference rather than 
proportion of income tax expense to profits before tax. To be more specific, I will measure 
permanent book tax differences following prior literature (Higgins et al., 2015) with some 
adjustments because this ratio is applied under US tax legislation. Under US tax legislation 
there three types of income tax expense which are the state or local tax, the United States 
federal tax and the foreign tax or outside United States tax. While, under GAS, there is 
usually one type of income tax expense which means that there is only one income tax rate. 
Despite these differences, both legislation distinguish current tax and deferred tax which is 
the key element in order to predict book-tax differences since taxable income is not 
disclosed in the financial statements. The calculation of the taxable income cannot be used 
in the Greek industry data, because this measure is adjusted to the American tax systems 
which differs from the Greek one. More specifically, taxable income is calculated by grossing 
up the sum of federal tax expense and foreign tax expense by the statutory rate. The 
American system has three types of income taxes which are the state, the federal and the 
foreign tax which concerns the corporate revenues which derive from outside of the USA. 
The existence of these three different measures led ne to the adjustment of this ratio 
consistent with prior literature. This is the reason why I calculated the taxable income by 
grossing up the current tax expense by the statutory rate of the respective year in each data 
section, consistent with prior literature (Brieger et al., 2019). Then, I subtracted the taxable 
income from the earnings before tax and divided by the total assets as it is calculated in the 
original models. Moreover, this measure is more suitable according to the Greek industry 
data sample for this dissertation because it is not mandatory to exclude the companies that 
have negative earnings before income tax (EBIT). The main concern of this ratio is the 
permanent differences that derive from the difference between the book income (EBIT) and 
the taxable income. This means that the ratio is not biased to the profit loss of the 
companies and contributing to the avoidance of the exclusion of these firms and the further 
sample minimization. Moreover, in the calculation of taxable income, I used 26% as income 
tax rate in 2014 values for each company, 29% as income tax rate for three consecutive 
years from 2015 to 2017 and 28% as income tax rate in 2018.  
Total book-tax differences are the sum of permanent differences and the temporary 
differences. According to GAS law, temporary differences are the differences that will be 
offset in the future which is the deferred tax. The main purpose of deferred tax is to offset 
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the permanent differences that result from book-tax differences. In order to calculate 
temporary differences, I use deferred tax scaled by the statutory rate. The Greek income tax 
rate has changed throughout the period under scrutiny and this is the reason why I use in 
every year the respective income tax rate that was applied in each period.  This method is 
also used in the calculation of the taxable income which is the current tax income expense 
scaled by the statutory rate (Brieger et al., 2019) rather than the sum-up of deferred tax 
(Higgins et al., 2015). So, the ratio is the difference between total book-tax differences which 
is pre-tax book income minus taxable income, and the permanent differences scaled by total 
assets. 
The second measure is the second most popular measure of the 37 articles under scrutiny 
after Cash ETR, which is the GAAP ETR (see Empirical Research on Tax aggressive/avoidance). 
GAAP ETR is the income tax paid scaled by earnings before income taxes and Cash ETR is the 
cash taxes paid, extracted from the cash flow statement scaled by earnings before taxes. As 
it is aforementioned GAAP ETR includes accrual based accounts which has as a consequence 
to be affected by earnings management. This is the main reason why many authors before 
were more in favor of Cash ETR, in order to exclude earnings management effects from the 
main ETR ratio. Other investigators preferred the cash flow from operating activities rather 
earnings before income taxes as a denominator in order to avoid the biases from the 
earnings management policies. However, the lack of personal information of the directors in 
the boardrooms which led to the exclusion of those companies and the significant sample 
minimization in combination with a significant amount of companies that had negative 
earning before management, is a factor that creates some biases to this ratio in this 
dissertation’s sample. Following prior literature(Higgins et al., 2015), I excluded the values 
that had negative numerator and run the regression with missing values in the dependent 
variable which is a possible sign that the model is not a perfect fit.  
5.3 Independent Variable 
The independent variable is a measure of women’s presence on the boards of the firms 
which were included in the sample. It is measured as the total women who served on the 
board in each year scaled by the total member of directors that served on the boardroom 
the respective year (see Appendix 1).   The data was extracted from annual financial 
statements from 2014 to 2018 for each company and I count only the directors that served 
on the board until the end of the year (Closing date Financial Statements). 
5.4 Control Variables 
The selection of the control variables was based on two studies that separated the control 
variables into two broader categories which are the board-level controls and the firm-level 
controls(Adams & Ferreira, 2009b; Lanis, Richardson, & Taylor, 2017b). The board-level 
controls are variables that control for some board characteristics that might affect the 
volume of directors’ aggressive decisions. Moreover, board-level controls include variables 
about characteristics of institutional ownership and audit companies, because institutional 
ownership and auditors might exert pressure on the directors’ adopted policies. These 
variables are the average age of the directors, directors’ financial or tax expertise, 
nationality, CEO years that the CEO has served on the respective position, the case where 
the duties of CEO and Chairman are combined, remuneration, blockholders who serve on 
the boardroom or they are external and the audit company (Lanis et al., 2017a). Firm-level 
controls are variables that take into consideration firm’s profitability, leverage, liquidity, 
possession of inventories, market capitalization and companies size (see Appendix 1).   
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BIND variable is measured as the proportion of the independent members in the Board of 
Directors (independent non-executive members and non-executive members). The 
boardroom independence is a more developed determinant, in prior literature than female 
presence on boards. However, Greek law controls for independence issues since it has 
quotas on directors’ independence as it is aforementioned (see Institutional framework of 
Greece). Moreover, the volume of riskiness of corporate policies may be affected by the age 
of the directors (AGEDIR), the proportion of the directors who are ethnically diverse 
(PETHDIVBOD) and the financial expertise that may earn through college or job experience 
(FINTAXEXP). In this point, I have to mention that FINTAXEXP is the proportion of the 
directors which I studied in their resumes that have studied economics, accounting and 
finance. Since many directors had finished law school, I chose only the directors that had an 
expertise in tax issues and as it comes to the directors that have studied management I 
chose only those that had expertise in financial management or previous bank experience. 
Most of the directors had economic expertise rather than strictly finance as it is calculated in 
prior literature (Lanis et al., 2017a). Thus, this ratio is adjusted to the Greek data by adding 
directors with bachelors’ degree in economics, expertise in taxation and bank experience. 
This is the reason why I cannot predict the sign of this control variable’s coefficient.  
CEOTENURE is a variable that indicates the years that the CEO has the respective position 
and the CEODUAL variable is a dummy variable equals 1 when the responsibilities of the 
chairman and the CEO are concentrated on the same person and 0, otherwise. Chief 
Executive officer’s position is of tremendous significance and it has to be included in the 
model (Lanis et al., 2017a). MTOBOD controls for the proportion of the shares that are 
controlled by the directors who serve on the boardroom. I only took into consideration the 
directors that directly own more than 5% of the company’s share. BLOCKHOLD control for 
the blockholders which do not participate in the board of directors. Closing the board-level 
control variables’ category, I used the control variable BIG4AUD, which is a dummy variable 
that takes the value of 1 if the company has been audited by one of the Big 4 Audit firms 
(KPMG, Deloitte, PwC and EY). Before finishing the representation of the board-level control 
variable, I have to mention that I did not include a remuneration variable. Rem is measured 
as the total remuneration of directors and managers and controls for remuneration (Lanis et 
al., 2017a). I extract the total remuneration of directors in upper positions from the financial 
statements, but most companies disclose only the sum of directors’ and managers’ 
remuneration. This is the reason why I could not follow the exact ratio from literature and 
thus, I exclude the variable from the models I followed. 
As far as the firm-level control variables’ category is concerned, SIZE controls for size effects 
(measured as the natural logarithm of total assets). According to prior research, (Lanis & 
Richardson, 2018; Lanis et al., 2017b)the size of a firm is related to tax aggressiveness since 
it is proved that larger companies possess greater political power compare to smaller firms. 
This privilege might enable larger companies to minimize their tax burden and thus, to be 
more tax aggressive(Richardson & Lanis, 2007).  
Following prior literature there are three basic avenues that may be used from multinational 
companies in order to avoid tax payment. Avoiding taxation may be achieved through the 
use of leverage, intangibles and tax heavens (Markle & Shackelford, 2011). LEV (measured as 
the long-term debt scaled by total assets) controls for the volume of the firm’s leverage. The 
strategic use of leverage is concentrated mostly on the fact that interest is tax deductible. 
Highly leveraged companies are more tax aggressive. As it comes to intangibles, I focused my 
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research on intellectual property. According to the statistics only 15,34% of the companies 
had at least one trademark, 2,65% had at least one patent while only the 4,76% of the 
companies possessed both in 2019. Despite the tax privileges that firms with patents have, I 
excluded intellectual property due to the low rates of the variable. According to the 
existence of subsidiaries in a foreign country, the initial model controlled for this issue (Lanis 
et al., 2017a), which I excluded, because it will be biased in my dataset. Greek industry is 
small and thus, it is reasonable for a Greek big company to have subsidiaries in a foreign 
country in order to expand its business.  
As far as profitability, growth rates and Cash equivalents are concerned, they are three 
variables that are included in tax aggressive models in prior literature. ROA (measured as the 
EBIT scaled by total assets) controls for the firm’s profitability, while MKTBK (measured as 
the market value of equity scaled by the book value of equity) controls for the firm’s growth 
rates. Following prior literature, the results obtained for these variables are contradicting. 
Growth firms though, are more likely to possess tax favored assets and become more tax 
aggressive. Moreover, CASH (measured as the cash holdings scaled by lagged total assets) 
control for the company’s cash need and it is a variable that is used in tax aggressive models 
in prior literature(Lanis & Richardson, 2018). 
5.5 Regression Model  
 
The following regression model is based on Lanis et al. (2015) model and examines the 
relation between corporate tax aggressiveness and gender diversity in the 112 Greek 
companies included in the sample from 2014 to 2018. 
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PERMBTD calculated as the difference between total book-tax differences and temporary 
book-tax differences, scaled by the total assets. Total book-tax difference is calculated as the 
difference between pre-tax book income and taxable income. Taxable income is calculated 
by grossing up current income tax expense which is disclosed in the notes of the financial 
statements. Temporary book-tax differences are the calculated by grossing up deferred tax 
expense by the income tax expense that was applied the respective year. ETR is total tax 
income tax expense scaled by the Earnings before taxes; pWOM is the independent variable 
and it is the proportion of women served on the board of directors scaled by the total 
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directors in the respective board each year; BIND is the proportion of directors that are 
independent non-executive and non-executive; FINTAXEXP is the proportion of directors 
who serve on board with financial or tax expertise; AGEDIR is the average age of the 
directors who served on the board; PETHDIVBOD is the proportion of directors that do not 
have Greek nationality; CEOTENURE is the years that the CEO has served in the CEO position; 
CEODUAL is a dummy variable, coded 1 if the duties of chairman and chief executive officer 
are concentrated on the same person, otherwise 0; MTOBOD is the total proportion of 
corporate stock owned by directors who serve on the board; BLOCKHOLD is the total 
proportion of ordinary shares capital of blockholders who hold at least 5% of the 
outstanding shares and do not serve on the board; BIG4AUD is a dummy variable, coded 1 if 
the audit firm is KPMG, PwC, E&Y or Deloitte, otherwise 0; SIZE is the natural logarithm of 
assets; ROA is the ratio of Income before taxes scaled by total assets; LEV is the ratio of 
longterm debt scaled by total assets; MKTBK is the ratio of the market value of equity 
divided by the book value of equity; CASH is the Cash and Cash equivalents from the annual 
statements scaled by total assets; and YEAR is a year dummy variable, coded 1 if the year 
falls within the specifice year category, otherwise 0; ε is the error term.  
6. Empirical Results and Analysis 
6.1 Descriptive Statistics 
In this section, I analyze the descriptive statistics of the main variables, and also I used some 
metrics in order to analyze the probability distribution of the variables. I concentrated on 
the mean, standard deviation, the minimum, the maximum value, skewness and kurtosis. 
The descriptive statistics of the model’s variables and the descriptive statistics of the two 
categories of the dependent variable are shown in Table 2(see Appendix 2): 
[Insert Table 2 about here] 
For the best analysis of the dependent value, I created two additional variables about the 
size of board of directors (bodsize) and the number of women that served on the board 
(WomenNumb) for each year from 2014 to 2018 for every company under scrutiny. These 
two variables are the components of Pwom, since it is the women served on the board 
(women) scaled by the size of board of directors (bodsize) in a specific year at a specific 
company. Taking into consideration the descriptive statistics and a wide a number of values 
close to 0 (P25=0), the distribution of Pwom at first glance can be considered as normal but 
skewed to the left. The skewness to the left is due to the numerator of the ratio, 
WomenNumb, because there is a lack in women in the Greek boardrooms which is 
translated to the skewness of the probability distribution to 0. However, pWOM is a more 
normalized than distribution of WomenNumb, because of the boardroom size effect which 
has as a consequence the standard deviation of pWOM to be lower (sd pWOM= 0,14 and sd 
WomenNumb= 1,05)  and the kurtosis to be higher than WomenNumb’s distribution( 
kurtosis pWOM= 4,02 and sd WomenNumb= 3,90) .  
According to the descriptive statistics it can been seen that the board of directors’ 
independence (BIND) and women’s proportion on boardrooms (Pwom) is a result of the law 
enforcement relative to quotas on independence of the board issue in the Greek industry. 
To be more specific, the state has taken into consideration the need of law in the 
independence of boardrooms and thus, the probability distribution is more normalized, 
because companies’ mean and second quartile are close enough (mean=0,639 and 
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p50=0,625). Probably if there was a law about women’s presence on boards the distribution 
would not be skewed to zero. Moreover, the 56,8 average years of directors’ age is a 
consequence of the relations that exist in the Greek system (see Institutional framework of 
Greece), since most of the older directors are the founders of the firms who most of the 
times are blockholders of the company. This close relation affects also CEOTENURE variable 
since most of the founders or owners of the company are also CEOs which explains the fact 
that a great deal of director in the sample, 50%, has been serving on the position of CEO for 
9 to 42 years. The existence of high variance, though, is a consequence of the need of CEO 
who are more expert on finance or regal issues than the corporations’ founders, since most 
of the firms hire experienced CEO in order to expand the volume of revenue or to keep up 
with the pace. Therefore, these fluctuations caused by the existence of the founders on 
boards and the need of young directors with new ideas creates high variance rates.  
As it comes to the firm specific variables and MKTBK, p75= 0,76154 and max=41,5573. This 
indicates that the biggest part of market capitalization is concentrated on a few number of 
companies little companies have the greatest market capitalization. Following the lead, 
CASH variable has low rates, which indicates the lack in liquidity in the Greek market, while 
according to the 3ht quartile of LEV ratio, 64% of the companies (difference between 
p75=0,36 and max=1) are high leveraged by long-term debt. Moreover, negative values of 
roa were reasonable due to the sample selection and a great deal of companies included in 
the sample that had negative earnings before income taxes.   
6.2 Correlation Matrix 
In this section, I used Pearson pairwise correlation. The results are represented in two 
Panels. Panel A is the correlation matrix of the dependent variable of, permanent 
differences, PERMBTD, and Panel B is the correlation matrix of the dependent of Effective 
Tax Rates, ETR.  
[Insert Table 3 about here] 
 
Panel A indicates (see Appendix 2 Table 3 Panel A), the Pearson pairwise correlation results 
of Model 1. Significant negative correlations are found between the dependent variable 
PERMBTD and the independent variable Pwom. This result indicates the significant negative 
association of the women’s presents on boards from the period of 2014 to 2018 in 112 
Greek companies with corporate tax aggressiveness. Moreover, in the correlation matrix are 
included the board-level controls (BIND, PETHDIVBOD, FINTAXEXP, AGEDIR, CEOTENURE, 
CEODUAL, MTOBOD, BLOCKHOLD, BIG4AUD) and the firm-level controls (MKTBK, SIZE, ROA, 
LEV, CASH). 
Panel B Table 2 indicates (see Appendix 2 Table 3 Panel B), the Pearson pairwise correlation 
results of Model 2. Negative correlations are found between the dependent variable ETR 
and the independent variable Pwom, but not significant. The lack of significance is expected, 
because the values of the dependent variable were minimized due to the exclusion of the 
companies that had negative earnings before income taxes. This result indicates the 
negative association of the women’s presents on board from the period of 2014 to 2018 in 
112 Greek companies with corporate tax aggressiveness. Despite the data minimization in 
the ETR ratio and the lack of significance of the independent variable, ETR ratio is interesting 
because it includes only the values of companies with positive earnings before interest are 
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excluded. Thus, it is easier to compare Model 1 with Model 2 in order to observe some 
differences between the reaction of female women on companies that had negative and 
positive earnings before interest (see Appendix 2 table 4) .  Moreover, in the correlation 
matrix are included the board-level controls (BIND, PETHDIVBOD, FINTAXEXP, AGEDIR, 
CEOTENURE, CEODUAL, MTOBOD, BLOCKHOLD, BIG4AUD) and the firm-level controls 
(MKTBK, SIZE, ROA, LEV, CASH).  
  
6.3 Results  
I present my OLS regression results on board diversity and tax aggressiveness along with 
control variables shown in table 4 (see Appendix 2). Model (1), which is the main model of 
this dissertation, represents the pooled regression between permanent differences 
(PERMBTD), women’s presence in boardroom (Pwom), board-level controls and the firm-
level controls. In respect of women presence on boards, my results demonstrate that 
pfemdiv (coef= -0.0503, p<0,1) is positively related to tax aggressiveness and statistically 
significant. For board-level control variables, the signs were equal to the predicted ones, but 
there were not any statistical significant coefficients. On the contrary, ROA (coef= -0,00881 , 
p<0,01) is statistically significant and negatively related to the dependent and Cash (coef 
=0,0892 , p<0,05) is statistically significant and positively related to tax aggressiveness.  
[Insert Table 4 about here] 
In model 2, shown in Table 4 (see Appendix 2), I use ETR variable as the dependent variable. 
Model 2 represents the pooled regression between ETR, women’s presence in boardroom 
(Pwom), board-level controls and the firm-level controls. R-squared dramatically dropped 
from 49.7% to 14,3% and some signs are not equal to the predicted ones. This is reasonable 
since we excluded the values of the firms that had loss before taxes. However, big4audit 
(coef=4,932 , p<0,05) is negatively and significantly related to tax aggressiveness indicating 
that companies who have profits when a big audit company exerts pressure on them are 
more  prudent than those that had loses which are included in Model 1 and the coefficient is 
positive and insignificant.  
Model 3 and 4, represent the pooled regression between the dependent, the independent 
variables and the board-level control variables. In Model 3, the tax aggressive measure is the 
permanent book tax differences and in Model 4, it is the ETR measure. Following, the first 
two models, Model 3 has a better fit than Model 4 due to the exception of companies with 
negative equity. In spite of the fact that the women’s presence is negatively related to tax 
aggressiveness the signs in the other two models are different indicating the significance of 
firm-level controls. According to prior literature, risk preference is the main determinant of 
women’s decision and thus, we should control for ratio that might indicate risky situations 
(e.g. high leverage rates, low profitability).  
Finally, model 5 and model 6 represent the pooled regression between the dependent, the 
independent variables and the firm-level control variables. In Model 5, the tax aggressive 
measure is the permanent book tax differences and in Model 6, the dependent is the ETR 
ratio. These two models were regressed in order to realize the significance of the control 
variables. Model 5 is fits better than Model 3, but this does not happen in the case of Model 
4 and Model 6 creating question about the women’s opinion on boards when companies are 
profitable.  
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Overall, I excluded the remuneration and the inventory variable from the OLS regression 
Models, because they affected the significance of the independent variable (pWOM). This 
probably happened because I used the sum of directors’ and managers and most variables 
that I used had a percentage from and numbers in euros. I was not able to extract 
information of the total performance-based remuneration in order to create the ratio used 
in prior literature(Lanis et al., 2017a). Moreover, I had to adjust my model to the 112 
companies and the lack in inventories in a great deal of the companies caused some spurring 
on the sample so as to exclude the inventory variable as well.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
7. Conclusions 
This study investigates the influence of gender diversity of the Greek boards on tax 
aggressiveness. My pooled OLS regression results indicate a negative and statistical 
significant association between female presence on boards and corporate tax aggressive 
policies. According to my investigation, this result was from the regression of the model 
which included companies with negative earnings before profits, control variables for firm-
level variables and board-level variables including independence of board of directors, 
education, age and nationality.   In spite of the fact that the descriptive statistics presented a 
sign of tokenism due to the existence of many boards with zero women, the association was 
statistically significant which proves that women opinion matters on board’s decision.  
In order to improve my dissertations’ analysis, two methods that I could use in order to 
make a better regression analysis would be the fixed-effect and the random effect model 
instead of a pooled regression. Despite of the fact that I include control variables for each 
year under scrutiny, I could create another variable which would control for the industry 
sector, since there are evidence that tax aggressiveness is affected by the fluctuations across 
the sectors. Moreover, as it is aforementioned, the distribution of the dependent value is 
skewed to the left, because of the lack in women in the Greek industry. Therefore, the 
existence of zero value to a great extent in the value of women’s proportion on the Greek 
boards should be further tested in order to check for inconsistencies. Moreover, according 
to prior research, authors used two-Stage Heckman procedure so as to deal with 
endogeneity and it would also be better to conduct some heteroscedasticity tests in order to 
control for heteroscedasticity.  
Future research on the effect of gender boardroom diversity on the adoption of corporate 
tax aggressive policies could be several issues. First, according to prior literature, there are 
evidence that women and men follow the same volume in aggressive policies when 
blockholders or analyst coverage exert pressure on them. Specifically, an investigation of the 
reaction of female directors serving on boards of Greek companies to the external pressure 
compare to the male directors serving on respective boards. Second, the use of a wider 
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period sample in order to investigated female directors’ reactions on the fluctuation of the 
tax rates. Third, following the same notion, it would be interesting to create a sample which 
will include pre-crisis and crisis period in order to investigate boardroom diversity reaction 
to the change of economic circumstances. Fourth, future research could also study whether 
women presence on the Greek Boards enhance shareholders value or profitability returns. 
Since, women’s presence on European boards is undergoing a revival of popularity, it would 
be a great contribution in the literature an article which will give a clear view of female 
directors’ contribution to the Greek firms in order for the community to have gender quotas 
on Greek Boards.  Fifth, a further research could be on the effectiveness of women as 
blockholders. Most of Greek companies, have as Chairman or CEOs the founders of the firms 
and family members or descendant of the founders. It would be interesting a research on 
whether women have a significant association with tax aggressiveness because of their 
family origins. 
This study provides unique insights as far as the association of female directors who serve in 
the Greek boards and corporate tax aggressiveness is concerned. This issue has not been 
further developed in the Greek industry and, thus this dissertation helps to develop the 
literature regarding the link between women and tax aggressiveness in Greece. There is a 
wide range of control variables especially, regarding the board characteristics and therefore, 
board diversity. Moreover, my results have important implication, because it is an issue that 
rise in popularity and thus, enhance the magnitude of this matter which is the gender quotas 
on boards in the Greek industry.  
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Appendices 
Appendix 1  
Table 1:Variable definitions 
  Variables   Definition               
 
Dependent Variable 
 PERMBTD 
 
the difference between total book-tax differences and temporary book-tax differences,  
 
scaled by the total assets. Total book-tax difference is calculated as the difference between  
 
pre-tax book income and taxable income. Taxable income is calculated by grossing up current  
 
income tax expense which is disclosed in the notes of the financial statements. Temporary  
 
book-tax differences are the calculated by grossing up deferred tax expense 
  by the income tax expense that was applied the respective year.   
   ETR 
 
Total tax expense scaled by profits before earnings 
 
Indipendent Variable 
 pWOM 
 
proportion of women that served on the board of directors at a specific year in each company 
 Board control variables 
 BIND 
 
proportion of non-executive directors and independent non-executive directors that  
 
served on the board 
 FINTAXEXP proportion of directors who serve on board with financial or tax expertise  
 AGEDIR 
 
the average age of the directors who served on the board 
 PETHDIVBOD the proporiton of directors that do not have Greek nationality 
 CEOTENURE the years that the CEO has served in the CEO position 
 CEODUAL 
 
A dummy variable, coded 1 if the duties of chairman and chief executive officer are  
 
concentrated on the same person, otherwise 0 
 MTOBOD 
 
the total proportion of corporate stock owned by directors who serve on the board  
 
BLOCKHOLD the total proportion of ordinary shares capital of blockholders who hold at least 5% of  
 
the outstanding shares and do not serve on the board 
 BIG4AUD 
 
A dummy variable, coded 1 if the audit firm is KPMG, PwC, E&Y or Deloitte, otherwise 0 
 Firm control variables 
 SIZE 
 
the natural logarithm of assets 
 ROA 
 
Income bofore taxes scaled by total assets 
 LEV 
 
longterm debt scaled by total assets 
 MKTBK 
 
The market value of equity divided by the book value of equity 
 CASH 
 
Cash and Cash equivalents scaled by total assets 
 
YEAR 
 
Year dummy variable, coded 1 if the year falls within the specifice year category, otherwise 0 
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Appendix 2  
Table 2: Descriptive statistics 
 
 Panel A: Descriptive statistics for the depedent variable PERMBTD, 2018-2014  
Variable sd mean variance max min kurtosis skewness 
2018 13,2 -1,2 173,8 5,3 -138,0 108,0 -10,3 
2017 28,3 2,9 801,2 299,6 -2,8 111,7 10,6 
2016 1,3 0,2 1,6 10,3 -2,0 47,0 6,5 
2015 28,9 0,0 836,7 146,5 -254,4 60,6 -4,9 
2014 13,8 0,1 191,6 64,6 -121,0 58,5 -5,0 
 
 Pancel B Descriptive statistics for the depdent variable ETR, 2018-2014  
   
Variable sd mean variance max min kurtosis skewness 
2018 0,89 0,17 0,79 1,47 -6,07 38,65 -5,67 
2017 0,87 0,28 0,75 5,55 -3,57 26,04 2,15 
2016 3,97 0,84 15,75 32,60 -0,92 64,97 8,00 
2015 7,21 1,68 51,97 52,50 -0,62 49,02 6,88 
2014 0,83 0,45 0,69 4,80 -1,79 14,33 2,74 
 
 Panel C Descriptive statistics of the model variables, women presence and boardroom size  
Variable sd mean variance max min p25 p50 p75 kurtosis skewness 
bodsize 2,59 8,12 6,72 21,00 4,00 6,00 7,00 9,00 4,18 1,10 
women 1,05 0,91 1,10 5,00 0,00 0,00 1,00 1,00 3,90 1,16 
pWOM 0,14 0,12 0,02 0,60 0,00 0,00 0,09 0,20 4,02 1,21 
BIND 0,16 0,64 2,40 0,02 0,63 0,54 0,63 0,77 -0,20 0,20 
PETHDIVBOD 0,17 0,10 0,03 0,88 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,14 8,78 2,31 
FINTAXEXP 0,21 0,39 0,04 1,00 0,00 0,25 0,40 0,56 2,66 0,02 
AGEDIR 6,34 56,85 40,18 81,44 36,00 53,33 57,00 61,25 3,63 -0,15 
CEOTENURE 11,85 13,35 140,54 46,00 0,00 4,00 9,00 21,00 2,95 0,97 
CEODUAL 0,49 0,42 0,24 1,00 0,00 
   
1,12 0,34 
MTOBOD 4,46 0,75 19,88 54,72 0,00 0,00 0,30 0,61 122,89 10,85 
BLOCKHOLD 4,82 0,75 23,29 74,62 0,00 0,00 0,17 0,49 145,50 11,41 
BIG4AUD 0,44 0,26 0,19 1,00 0,00 
   
2,21 1,10 
MKTBK 
4,13 0,50 17,04 41,56 
-
70,26 
0,11 0,41 0,76 96,13 -8,05 
SIZE 0,98 5,26 0,96 9,60 3,26 4,53 5,02 5,80 3,85 1,00 
CASH 0,10 0,09 0,01 0,89 0,00 0,02 0,05 0,13 12,83 2,52 
ROA 
7,76 0,01 60,29 18,99 
-
63,23 
-2,42 0,56 3,91 13,47 -1,90 
LEV 0,20 0,22 0,04 1,00 0,00 0,06 0,18 0,36 4,01 1,03 
 Where,  BOD=      sum of directors served on the board 
  Women= sum of female directors served on the board  
pWOM 
 
proportion of women that served on the board of directors at a specific 
22 
 
year in each company 
BIND 
 
proportion of non-executive directors and independent non-executive 
directors that served on the board 
FINTAXEXP proportion of directors who serve on board with financial or tax expertise  
AGEDIR 
 
the average age of the directors who served on the board 
PETHDIVBOD the proporiton of directors that do not have Greek nationality 
CEOTENURE the years that the CEO has served in the CEO position 
CEODUAL 
 
A dummy variable, coded 1 if the duties of chairman and chief executive 
officer are concentrated on the same person, otherwise 0 
MTOBOD 
 
the total proportion of corporate stock owned by directors who serve on 
the board  
BLOCKHOLD 
the total proportion of ordinary shares capital of blockholders who hold at 
least 5% of the outstanding share and do not serve on board 
BIG4AUD 
 
A dummy variable, coded 1 if the audit firm is KPMG, PwC, E&Y or Deloitte, 
otherwise 0 
SIZE 
 
the natural logarithm of assets 
ROA 
 
Income bofore taxes scaled by total assets 
LEV 
 
longterm debt scaled by total assets 
MKTBK 
 
The market value of equity divided by the book value of equity 
CASH 
 
Cash and Cash equivalents scaled by total assets 
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Table 3: Correlation Matrix 
Panel A: Correlation Matrix of permanent differences 
book PERMBTD pWOM BIND PETHDIVBOD FINTAXEXP AGEDIR CEOTENURE CEODUAL 
         
PERMBTD 1        
pWOM -0,0816* 1       
BIND 0,0747 -0,3054 1      
PETHDIVBOD -0,1039 -0,0985 0,2695 1     
FINTAXEXP -0,067 -0,0918 0,0931 0,1538 1    
AGEDIR -0,0075 -0,0425 0,0626 0,0378 0,0781 1   
CEOTENURE -0,0513 0,1984 -0,2303 -0,165 -0,0352 0,0951 1  
CEODUAL 0,0171** 0,1424 -0,043 -0,2604 -0,1349 -0,2144 0,3061 1 
MTOBOD 0,0543 0,0633 -0,0494 -0,0606 0,0039 -0,0302 -0,0093 -0,0246 
BLOCKHOLD 0,0268 -0,0406 -0,0613 0,0188 0,019 -0,0064 -0,0939 0,0382 
BIG4AUD -0,0262 -0,0901 0,2975 0,3254 0,2681 0,2665 -0,179 -0,193 
SIZE -0,1282 -0,1148 0,1941 0,2914 0,011 0,3689 -0,0984 -0,0674 
MKTBK -0,0231 0,0095 -0,0191 -0,0746 0,0185 -0,0055 0,0684 0,0388 
ROA -
0,6829** 
0,0174 -0,0722 0,132 0,1196 -0,0203 0,0224 0,0603 
LEV -0,0305 -0,1385 -0,1299 -0,0518 -0,094 0,062 0,1139 0,1885 
CASH -
0,1438** 
-0,0109 -0,0137 -0,0115 -0,0164 -0,0095 -0,0282 0,0234 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
Panel A(continued in the next page): Correlation Matrix of permanent differences 
 
MTOBOD BLOCKHOLD BIG4AUD SIZE MKTBK ROA LEV CASH 
        
        
        
        
        
        
        
        
        
1        
0,3282 1       
-0,0688 -0,0332 1      
-0,1561 -0,0681 0,5206 1     
0,0026 -0,0004 -0,0454 -0,0005 1    
-0,0787 -0,0853 0,1279 0,2206 0,0402 1   
-0,072 0,0357 0,0158 0,1586 -0,0173 0,0444 1  
-0,025 -0,0599 0,229 0,0582 0,0861 0,3551 -0,132 1 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Panel b: Correlation Matrix of ETR 
 
ETR pWOM BIND PETHDIVBOD FINTAXEXP AGEDIR CEOTENURE CEODUAL 
         
ETR 1        
pWOM -0,1072 1       
BIND 0,156 -0,3027 1      
PETHDIVBOD -0,0036 -0,1495 0,2745 1     
FINTAXEXP 0,0017 -0,0129 -0,0636 0,071 1    
AGEDIR 0,0865 -0,183 -0,0813 -0,0283 0,0984 1   
CEOTENURE -0,085 0,0989 -0,2624 -0,2342 0,0218 0,0872 1  
CEODUAL -0,1196 0,3001 0,0525 -0,2452 -0,1862 -0,1794 0,4555 1 
MTOBOD -0,0067 0,0701 -0,042 -0,063 0,0209 -0,0331 -0,034 -0,0407 
BLOCKHOLD 0,0126 0,0154 0,0321 0,0259 0,0266 -0,0082 -0,1242 -0,1172 
BIG4AUD 0,1451 -0,1024 0,2992 0,3003 0,2053 0,2136 -0,1545 -0,1745 
SIZE 0,0324 -0,2462 0,1766 0,3684 -0,1376 0,3344 -0,0732 -0,0791 
MKTBK -0,0097 -0,0036 0,0047 -0,0026 0,0617 -0,0238 0,0567 0,0567 
ROA -0,0374 -0,0196 0,0141 0,1082 0,1392 0,0193 0,043 0,0162 
LEV -0,0968* -0,2149 0,0398 0,0992 -0,0278 0,2085 0,1527 -0,0692 
CASH -0,0877* -0,0516 0,1102 0,0201 0,0366 0,0295 -0,0516 0,0642 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
 
Panel B (continued in the next page): Correlation Matrix of ETR 
MTOBOD BLOCKHOLD BIG4AUD SIZE MKTBK ROA LEV CASH 
        
        
        
        
        
        
        
        
        
1        
0,977 1       
-0,0622 -0,0236 1      
-0,2061 -0,1387 0,499 1     
-0,0022 0,001 -0,0475 -0,0209 1    
-0,1504 -0,156 0,1873 0,1384 0,0284 1   
-0,1054 -0,0656 0,1148 0,3557 -0,0252 0,0134 1  
-0,0513 -0,0783 0,2661 0,1187 0,0113 0,3143 -0,2481 1 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 4: OLS Regression Results 
    (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
VARIABLES 
Predicted 
sign PERMBTD ETR PERMBTD ETR PERMBTD ETR 
                
Pwom - -0.0503* -2.090 -0.115** -0.590 -0.0272 -2.680 
 
(0.0296) (2.751) (0.0554) (2.502) (0.0213) (1.716) 
BIND - -0.0131 4.599 0.0629 4.550* 
 (0.0269) (2.794) (0.0507) (2.491) 
 PETHDIVBOD - -0.00416 -2.590 0.00261 -2.534 
 (0.0267) (2.604) (0.0515) (2.317) 
 FINTAXEXP ? 0.00817 -1.101 -0.0627* -0.433 
 (0.0189) (1.832) (0.0353) (1.667) 
 AGEDIR - -0.000221 0.0544 0.000524 0.0338 
 (0.000666) (0.0561) (0.00124) (0.0512) 
 CEOTENURE ? -0.000332 0.0166 0.00103 0.00158 
 (0.000365) (0.0369) (0.000694) (0.0328) 
 CEODUAL + 0.0177** -0.852 0.0159 -0.908 
 (0.00852) (0.890) (0.0159) (0.802) 
 MTOBOD ? 0.000516 -0.186 0.00237 -0.00173 
 (0.00129) (0.506) (0.00173) (0.0879) 
 BLOCKHOLD - -0.000869 0.263 0.000255 -0.0123 
 (0.000895) (1.004) (0.00161) (0.110) 
 BIG4AUD ? 0.0113 1.932** 0.00697 1.120 
 (0.0105) (0.967) (0.0178) (0.790) 
 MKTBK ? -0.000122 -0.00974 
 
-0.000156 -0.0170 
 
(0.000735) (0.0530) 
 
(0.000696) (0.0439) 
SIZE + 0.000510 -0.144 
 
0.000441 0.256 
 
(0.00517) (0.575) 
 
(0.00318) (0.294) 
ROA - 
-
0.00881*** 0.00439 
 
-
0.00777*** -0.0147 
 
(0.000546) (0.0529) 
 
(0.000423) (0.0359) 
LEV ? -0.00153 -4.920** 
 
-0.0162 -2.440* 
 
(0.0198) (2.028) 
 
(0.0151) (1.273) 
CASH + 0.0892** -9.346** 
 
0.0749** -3.464 
 
(0.0120) (0) (0.0229) (1.077) (0) (0) 
Constant 
 
0.0328 -1.728 -0.00729 -3.973 0.0296 0.366 
 
(0.0448) (4.412) (0.0825) (3.696) (0.0188) (1.637) 
Year 
Dummies 
 
Included Included Included Included Included Included 
Observations 
 
338 190 380 204 483 279 
R-squared   0.497 0.143 0.047 0.087 0.445 0.050 
Standard errors in parentheses 
 *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 5: Model summary statistics in the regression results of Table 4 
 
Model 
summary 
statistics 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Nymber of 
obs 
338 190 380 204 483 279 
F 16,57 1,5 1,29 1,28 37,85 1,42 
Prob>F 0 0,0922 0,2108 0,2198 0 0,17 
R-squeard 0,497 0.143 0.047 0.087 0.445 0.050 
Adj R-
squared 
0,4675 0,0475 0,0106 0,0193 0,4332 0,015 
Root MSE 0,6492 4,4381 0,13391 4,3506 0,06345 3,735 
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Appendix 3 
Graph 1: Tax Revenues in Greece, 2014-2018 
 
Graph 2: Income tax rates in Greece, 2014-2019 
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Graph 3: Tax aggressiveness and tax avoidance measure on 7 high rated journals by ABS Guide from 2014-2019: 
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